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Abstract
Transparency has become an almost universal virtue among central banks. The paper 
tests empirically, for the case of the Federal Reserve, two hypotheses about central 
bank transparency derived from the debate of Morris and Shin (2002) and Svensson 
(2006). First, the paper finds that the precision of communication is a key 
determinant of the predictability of both FOMC decisions as well as the future policy 
path. Second, the effectiveness of communication is found to depend on the market 
environment. Specifically, a given statement may enhance predictability in an 
environment of high market uncertainty, but may reduce it when uncertainty is low. 
The findings underline the limits to transparency and stress the need for 
communication to be flexible and adjust to market conditions in order for central 
banks to achieve their ultimate objectives. 
JEL classification: E52, E58, D82. 
Keywords: communication; transparency; monetary policy; predictability; 
effectiveness; Federal Reserve.5
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Non-technical summary 
Central banks around the world have strived towards transparency and accountability over the 
past decade. Transparency is crucial for central banks to influence asset prices and interest 
rates, and ultimately to manage market expectations effectively and achieve policy objectives. 
However, despite this universal agreement about the importance of transparency, there is no 
consensus about how central banks should communicate, i.e. what elements precisely 
constitute an optimal and effective communication strategy. In fact, not only do central banks 
differ in their given mandates, but they also pursue fundamentally different communication 
strategies, even when mandates are similar. 
The debate on transparency has in recent years been shaped to a considerable extent by the 
important work of Morris and Shin (2002) and Amato, Morris and Shin (2002) and the 
subsequent discussion by Svensson (2006), Woodford (2005) and Morris, Shin and Tong 
(2006). The main argument of Amato, Morris and Shin is that central bank communication 
carries a dual role; first, as an information provider of private information of central banks, 
thereby helping guide expectations. And second, central bank communication serves as a 
focal point, and thus as a coordination device for the beliefs of financial market participants. 
Due to this role as focal point, communication may be welfare-reducing because of the risk 
that market participants may pay too much attention to central bank communication and too 
little to their own private information. In particular the disclosure of central bank information 
that is imprecise and noisy may lead markets away from equilibrium and thus reduce welfare. 
The present paper identifies two hypotheses that allow empirical testing of the Morris-Shin 
argument and ensuing debate, both under the assumption that an important contribution of 
communication to welfare lies in making central bank actions predictable. It tests these 
hypotheses for the case of the Federal Reserve, using a database of real-time newswire 
reporting (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007a) that contains statements by the committee as well 
as by the individual FOMC members.  
Concerning the first of the hypotheses, the empirical results of the paper indicate that 
communication exerts a statistically and economically significant effect on the short-term 
predictability as well as the uncertainty about the future policy path. The effect of 
communication does depend on the precision of the signal that is issued, however. More 
precise signals are beneficial in helping markets better anticipate future decisions. By 
contrast, communication that is dispersed and conveys not a single committee view but a 
variety of views on monetary policy inclinations reduces the predictability of decisions and 
worsens the ability of market participants to understand the future path of monetary policy. 
Moreover, the effect of communication depends also on the weight that financial markets 
attach to it; if this weight is exceptionally large, communication can easily be detrimental for 
predictability. In particular, statements that occur during the purdah period before FOMC 
meetings appear, on average, to have such a detrimental effect.  
As to the second hypothesis, the empirical findings suggest that the effectiveness of 
communication is highly state-dependent. In general, communication is more effective in an 
environment of large market uncertainty and more likely to be detrimental if the noisiness of 
private signals is low. Moreover, there are remarkable differences when comparing the results 
with regard to short-term predictability and the uncertainty about the policy path. One of these 
differences is that communication amid high market uncertainty often lowers the 
heterogeneity about the future FOMC policy path, but rarely improves short-term 
predictability. This is suggestive that statements that may enhance the understanding of the 
policy path over the medium term may not necessarily improve the short-term predictability 
of subsequent decisions, highlighting a further important trade-off for communication policy. 6
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1. Introduction
Central banks around the world have strived towards transparency and accountability over the 
past decade. Transparency is crucial for central banks to influence asset prices and interest 
rates, and ultimately to manage market expectations effectively and achieve policy objectives. 
However, despite this universal agreement about the importance of transparency, there is no 
consensus about how central banks should communicate, i.e. what elements precisely 
constitute an optimal and effective communication strategy. In fact, not only do central banks 
differ in their given mandates, but they also pursue fundamentally different communication 
strategies, even when mandates are similar (Blinder and Wyplosz 2004, Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher 2007a). This disagreement about communication strategies stems from the fact that 
not all communication may always be effective in enhancing transparency, e.g. as it may 
reduce clarity and common understanding among market participants or because there are 
limits to how much information individuals can digest (e.g. Kahneman 2003). 
The debate on transparency has in recent years been shaped to a considerable extent by the 
important work of Morris and Shin (2002) and Amato, Morris and Shin (2002) and the 
subsequent discussion by Svensson (2006), Woodford (2005) and Morris, Shin and Tong 
(2006). The main argument of Amato, Morris and Shin is that central bank communication 
carries a dual role; first, as an information provider about private information of central banks 
(Romer and Romer 2000), thereby helping guide expectations. And second, central bank 
communication serves as a focal point, and thus as a coordination device for the beliefs of 
financial market participants.  
Due to this role as focal point, communication may be welfare-reducing because of the risk 
that market participants may pay too much attention to central bank communication and too 
little to their own private information. In particular the disclosure of central bank information 
that is imprecise and noisy may lead markets away from equilibrium and thus reduce welfare. 
By contrast, Svensson (2006) shows that the validity of this argument depends on rather 
strong assumptions regarding the signal-to-noise ratio of central bank communication. He 
argues that in reality these assumptions may never be fulfilled, and thus that providing 
information through central bank communication may always be beneficial. Moreover, 
Woodford (2005) argues that the Morris-Shin result is even less likely to hold if one considers 
that the coordination of private agents’ actions may be a welfare objective as well. 
The present paper identifies two hypotheses that allow empirical testing of the Morris-Shin 
argument and ensuing debate, both under the assumption that an important contribution of 
communication to welfare lies in making central bank actions predictable. First, it analyses 
whether the effect of communication on predictability of monetary policy at short and 
medium horizons depends on the precision of this communication, and on the attention paid 
by financial markets. Second, it tests another key insight derived from the Morris-Shin model, 
namely, that the effectiveness of communication is dependent on the environment in which it 
occurs. On the one hand, a particular statement may enhance predictability when private 
signals are noisy, i.e. when there is a relatively high degree of uncertainty among market 
participants about the economy and the future path of monetary policy. Yet, on the other 
hand, the same communication may be detrimental if it occurs when such private signals are 
relatively precise, thus raising the overall level of noise in financial markets. The paper tests 
whether, and under what conditions such a non-linear effect of communication exists. 
The paper tests these hypotheses for the case of the Federal Reserve since February 1994, 
when it started announcing interest rate decisions immediately following its Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. We exploit a database of real-time newswire reporting 7
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(Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007a) that contains statements by the committee as well as by the 
individual FOMC members, such as speeches and interviews in the inter-meeting period.  
Overall, the empirical results of the paper provide strong support for the main hypotheses 
formulated by the Morris-Shin and Svensson debate. The findings show that communication 
is indeed a major determinant of the predictability of FOMC decisions and the future policy 
path.
First, a higher precision of the Federal Reserve’s communication, as proxied by its frequency, 
is found to improve predictability. However, there is a sizeable asymmetry in this effect as 
more information appears to help financial markets primarily in times of large uncertainty, i.e. 
when there is a high degree of noise in the information held by market participants. 
Communication that is characterized by a high degree of dispersion among committee 
members, and therefore most likely relatively imprecise, is detrimental for predictability, in 
particular when market uncertainty is otherwise low. Moreover, this dispersion is 
economically meaningful as, on average, it accounts for about one third of the market’s 
forecast errors of FOMC decisions since 1994. However, while being consistently harmful for 
predictability at short horizons, dispersed communication can be beneficial when it comes to 
the predictability at the longer term. These results shed light on the ongoing debate on 
whether central banks should communicate in a collegial manner – by conveying the 
consensus or majority view of the committee, or in an individualistic way – by stressing and 
conveying the diversity of views among the committee members, is still highly controversial.
3
Second, the attention paid by financial markets matters. We identify the purdah period
4 as a 
case where financial markets are particularly, and possibly overly, attentive to central bank 
communication. The empirical results underline that communication during the purdah period 
reduces predictability of decisions. 
Third, the effects of these different elements of central bank communication depend on the 
environment in which they are made. The same single element of communication may be 
beneficial in an environment of high market uncertainty; yet it may be detrimental under low 
market uncertainty. The findings of the paper thus underline the importance of flexibility in 
communication policies and the need to adapt to market conditions in order to achieve their 
ultimate objectives. In fact, a number of central banks are currently (and sometimes 
fundamentally so) changing their communication strategies, with some implicitly 
acknowledging the limits to transparency and thus restricting the amount and type of 
information they are willing to share.
5
3 Some policy-makers have argued that it is important to communicate this diversity among individual 
committee members because it helps markets understand the risks and anticipate monetary policy 
decisions (e.g. Bernanke 2004). By contrast, others have argued that such a communication strategy 
may not necessarily provide greater clarity and common understanding and thus that it may be 
important for central banks to communicate “with one voice” (e.g. Issing 1999, 2005). 
4 The purdah period, used by most central bank committees in mature economies, implies a voluntary, 
self-imposed rule that no member should communicate about monetary policy in the days immediately 
preceding and/or following policy-setting meetings. 
5 An interesting example is the decision by the Swedish Riksbank, announced on 11 May 2007, to 
increase the frequency of press conferences and to reveal the voting of individual committee members. 
Yet, the Swedish Riksbank also announced that it wants its committee members to abstain from 
communicating about monetary policy intentions in the inter-meeting period through speeches and 
interviews: “The Executive Board has come to the conclusion that there is not normally any reason to 
indicate how the repo rate will be set in speeches and press releases issued prior to the monetary policy 
meetings. Our assessment is that it is enough to signal our intentions clearly in connection with the 
seven monetary policy meetings held every year.” (Riksbank 2007) 8
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The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 briefly discusses related literature on 
central bank strategies and communication. To motivate our empirical analysis, section 3 
outlines a simple conceptual framework, along the lines of Morris and Shin (2002), stressing 
the importance of the interaction between communication and private information. The 
hypotheses, the underlying data and the methodology for the empirical analysis are presented 
in section 4. Section 5 then provides the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of 
communication, as well as several robustness tests. Section 6 summarizes the findings and 
draws some policy implications. 
2. Literature on communication and committees 
The present paper is linked to two strands of the literature; one focusing on the effect of 
central bank communication on financial markets; and a second on the design and 
effectiveness of central bank committees. This section briefly reviews some key studies in 
these areas in order to help place the present paper and outline its intended contribution. 
A number of recent studies build on the model by Morris and Shin (2002) and analyze the 
welfare implications of central bank transparency. Much of this work has concentrated on the 
quasi time consistency problem a central bank may face when providing new information. 
Due to the role as a focal point of a central bank, market participants are likely to discount the 
noisiness of central bank information and the conditionality of forward-looking information. 
While Faust and Leeper (2005) and Rudebusch and Williams (2006) focus on the existence of 
information asymmetry, Gosselin, Lotz and Wyplosz (2006) stress the role of information 
heterogeneity between central banks and the public, which may lead to the welfare-reducing 
effect of transparency. Cornand and Heinemann (2006) show in a theoretical setting that a 
limited dissemination of information by central banks may reduce the scope of coordinated 
action and thereby lower the likelihood of welfare-reducing communication effects. Limits to 
central bank transparency are furthermore discussed in Mishkin (2004) and Cukierman 
(2007). More general approaches underlining the value of transparency are Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006), Geraats (2002) and Dincer and Eichengreen (2007). 
As to the effect of communication on asset prices, Kohn and Sack (2004) investigate the 
effect of statements by former Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan on the volatility of 
various asset prices and find that overall they have had a sizeable effect. Reinhart and Sack 
(2006) analyze different types of communication by the FOMC and find that it is primarily 
the committee-wide communication that affects markets. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) 
take a broader perspective by analyzing and comparing the effects of communication on 
monetary policy inclinations and the economic outlook between the Federal Reserve, the 
Bank of England and the ECB. The paper finds that communication about the monetary 
policy inclination of committee members exerts substantial effects on financial markets for all 
three central banks, but that markets react significantly to statements about the economic 
outlook only by the FOMC. Andersson et al. (2006) find for the case of the Swedish Riksbank 
that both speeches and the inflation report affect the short end of the term structure, whereas 
only speeches exert an effect on the longer end. 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) concentrate on 
the communication of the Federal Reserve on FOMC meeting days, in particular the 
effectiveness of the balance-of-risks assessments the Federal Reserve has been providing 
since May 1999. Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) find that the bias has indeed been an 
effective guide of market expectations about the path of monetary policy. Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2007b) find that the balance-of-risks assessment has crowded out other sources of 
information. Moreover, Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004), Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2003) and Woodford (2005) stress that communication by the Federal Reserve has been 9
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particularly important when there was a risk that the US economy might be heading into a 
deflation and interest rates might hit the zero lower bound. 
On the literature on central bank committees, an important choice of a central bank is about 
the design and purpose of the policy-setting committee, and specifically also how much of the 
diversity of views in the committee to communicate to the public. Forward-looking 
information is generally surrounded by a substantial degree of uncertainty, which may change 
over time and be dependent on a variety of economic factors. A central bank must decide to 
what extent it wants to provide the public with information about the uncertainty it sees. As 
mentioned above, some policy-makers have emphasized the advantages of having an 
individualistic approach to communication in which the diversity of views across committee 
members are communicated (e.g. Bernanke 2004), while others have stressed the risks and 
potential costs (e.g. Issing 1999, 2005).  
The important work by Blinder and Wyplosz (2004) provides a broader framework for 
analyzing the functioning and set-up of different central bank committees. They distinguish 
between collegial and individualistic committees and central banks where decisions are taken 
by individuals. Their study encompasses a wider strand of the literature that has analyzed the 
role of committees in the decision-making process. There is a broad consensus that decision-
making in committees has improved the overall quality of the decisions, partly because it 
allows for learning and pooling of information (Blinder and Morgan 2005; Lombardelli, 
Proudman and Talbot 2005) and partly because it enhances the flexibility of policy to respond 
to shocks of different magnitude and nature (Sibert 2003, Mihov and Sibert 2006). At the 
same time, it has been shown that the voting record of committees, if released to the public, 
can provide useful information about future monetary policy decisions (Gerlach-Kristen 
2004).  
Despite these various strands of the literature on central bank communication, to our 
knowledge no paper has so far attempted to provide a systematic assessment of the 
effectiveness of communication. In particular, understanding how communication affects the 
predictability of policy decisions and of the path of future interest rates as well as the degree 
of market uncertainty about policy decisions remains highly controversial, but is crucial for 
assessing the overall effectiveness and success of central bank communication strategies. This 
is the objective of the present paper and its intended contribution to the literature. 
3. Morris-Shin framework of communication and noisy public signals 
The purpose of this section is to present a simple modeling framework, illustrating the effect 
of central bank communication, in order to motivate our subsequent empirical analysis. The 
model follows closely Morris and Shin (2002) and Amato, Morris and Shin (2002), the 
discussion thereof by Svensson (2006) and the reply by Morris, Shin and Tong (2006). The 
main feature of the model is the analysis of the conditions under which central bank 
communication may be welfare-reducing and how communication interacts with other, 
private signals of financial market participants. 
The main feature of the model is that communication has a dual role. On the one hand, 
communication provides information about relevant fundamentals to financial markets. This 
information is relevant for markets because a central bank may have superior information, not 
just about its own objectives, but also about the economy more generally as it puts substantial 
resources into understanding and forecasting economic developments (Romer and Romer 
2000). Even if it does not have superior information, the central bank’s assessment of the 
relevant fundamentals will be of importance to market participants, as it will affect future 
policy actions. On the other hand, central bank communication may serve as a focal point, 10
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and as such as a coordination device for the beliefs of financial market participants. Agents 
receive not only private signals about relevant fundamentals, but they also care about other 
agents’ beliefs, akin to the example of Keynes’ beauty contest. This feature is particularly 
relevant for understanding the incentive structure of financial market participants, who are 
partly assessed and rewarded not based on their absolute performance, but on their 
performance relative to that of other market participants. Hence decisions by investors are 
based both on their private information and their beliefs about other agents’ beliefs. 
 
The potentially welfare-reducing effect of central bank communication stems from the fact 
that the coordination role of communication induces agents to place too much weight on this 
public signal as compared to their private information than is socially optimal. This is of 
course only a problem to the extent that the public signal is noisy, i.e. inaccurate about the 
underlying fundamentals. A key point of the analysis is that public information, as e.g. 
provided through central bank communication, and private information might in essence 
become substitutes. 
 
The starting point, based on Morris and Shin (2002) and Svensson (2006) is Lucas’ (1972) 
“island economy“ model with a continuum of private agents of unit mass indexed over the 
unit interval [0,1]. Agent  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i  takes a decision pi – such as for instance the pricing of a 
security – and has a utility function of the following form: 
 
( )( ) ( ) [ ] L L r p r p U i i i − + − − − ≡
2 1 ) , ( θ θ       (1) 
 
with θ as the state variable, or fundamentals,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ r  as a constant, and  
 





2 , ) ( dj L L dj p p L j i j i  
 
The first term of (1) is a standard component indicating that the agent wants her decision pi to 
closely reflect and be consistent with the fundamentals θ, while the second element 
corresponds to the loss arising from the disagreement or “beauty contest” with (the average 
of) other agents. The constant r is the relative weight attached to each of the two components. 
 
Given this utility function, the optimal decision rule of agent i is given by 
 
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( p E r E r p i i i + − = θ      (2) 
 
with E(.) as the expectations operator and  p  the average decision across all other agents. 
From a welfare perspective, the social planner (or central bank) only cares about the first 
component of (1), i.e. the welfare objective is to induce decisions by agents that are as close 
as possible to the underlying fundamentals θ. This fundamental may be interpreted as the 
expected monetary policy rate. Thus the realized social welfare function can be written as 
 
() ( ) ∫ − − =
1
0
2 , di p p W i θ θ      (3) 
 
which averages over the utilities of all agents, normalized by (1–r). The difficulty stems from 
the fact that the state variable θ  is not observable and is surrounded by uncertainty. Each 
agent receives two types of signals about θ ; the first is a private signal,  i i x ε θ + = , where εi 
is i.i.d. with zero mean and variance 
2
ε σ . The second signal agents receive is the public 
signal,  η θ + = y , where η is also normally distributed with zero mean and variance 
2
η σ . 11
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Defining the relative precisions of the private signal as 
2 / 1      and of the public signal as 
2 / 1      implies that the expected value of the fundamental  is 
) /( ) ( ) (         i i x y E             (4) 
The substitution of this expected value into (2) yields a unique equilibrium for the optimal 
decision rule of agent i as a function of the signals received: 
 



















     (5) 
The key insight is that agents give relatively more weight to the public signal than the private 
signal – indicated by (1–r) in (5) – given that the former is common knowledge and given the 
objective of minimizing the disagreement with other agents, than the relative precisions of 
each of the signals would otherwise warrant. Substituting (4) and (5) into (3) yields the 














p W E 
 
 
       (6) 
Linking this welfare function to communication, the parameter  can be interpreted as the 
degree of transparency of a central bank. The question is under what conditions an increase in 
transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Through maximization of (6) with regard to , it 
results that this is the case if  
   r r   
 1 1 2 
       ( 7 )  
Figure 1 illustrates this trade-off between the precision of private and public signals. There 
are two key insights that result. First, an increase of transparency may be detrimental to 
welfare, and second, the condition under which it is detrimental depends crucially on the 
precision of the private signal. The first point is illustrated in the figure by the fact that, in the 
area to the left of the dashed line, an increase in  actually lowers welfare for any given .
The second point is that whether increasing  from a given level is detrimental or not is 
dependent on the precision of the private signal (the size of ).
Figure 1
The important point of Svensson (2006) is that this condition can hold only for specific values 
of r, i.e. only for  ) 1 , 5 . 0 (  r . For a value of r=0.75, the right-hand-side of (7) is maximized, 
so that condition (7) holds if and only if /< 1/8. In other words, for a value of r = 0.75 – 
i.e. agents attaching three quarters of their importance to the actions of other agents, and only 
one quarter to  – providing a public signal can reduce welfare only if the public signal is 
more than eight times as noisy as the private signal. Svensson argues that it is rather 
unrealistic that any public signal could be so noisy as to fulfill this condition. 
In their reply to Svensson, Morris, Shin and Tong (2006) suggest a slightly different twist to 
their model, by applying it to a central bank that ponders whether or not to release a public 
signal, rather than to a central bank that has established a certain level of transparency and 
needs to decide whether or not to increase the degree of transparency. The latter case can, for 
instance, be thought of as a central bank that has already communicated a monetary policy 12
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objective (and thus positioned itself in Figure 1 with a certain ), and deliberates publishing 
its monetary policy rule, or its macroeconomic model (to increase the level of ). The former 
possibility can be portrayed by a central bank that has just released a monetary policy 
decision, and needs to decide how much forward-looking communication it provides to the 
markets in order to guide their expectations about upcoming decisions. In this case, 
withholding the signal would imply setting  = 0, and the resulting welfare would need to be 
compared to the welfare with the signal. The hurdle rate, i.e. the level of precision of the 
public signal   required for its release to be welfare enhancing is then the value of  that 
solves V() = V(0), and is given by  
 1 2   r         ( 8 )  
Morris, Shin and Tong argue that the hurdle rate can actually be quite high, in particular as r
approaches unity. This is shown in Figure 1, where the resulting hurdle rate for a given level 
of  lies substantially to the right of the dashed line. They state: “The debate thus moves on to 
the question of whether the public signal is sufficiently precise to justify disclosure. The issues 
are then empirical, and the answer depends on the context.” (p. 453; emphasis in original). 
The empirical test of this hypothesis is the key objective of the present paper. Although we 
are obviously not able to formulate a structural model based on this conceptual framework, 
we use the insights of the Morris-Shin model to motivate the formulation and specification of 
our empirical model. 
4. Hypotheses and data 
This section outlines the empirical specification of our model for testing the effectiveness of 
central bank communication. The section starts by stating the main hypotheses of the 
empirical analysis (section 4.1), and then discusses the choice of proxies for the model 
variables (section 4.2) 
4.1   Hypotheses 
The Morris-Shin model postulates that social welfare (W) depends on the quality of public 
signals provided by the central bank (), and the quality of the available private signals ().
To put this hypothesis to an empirical test, we have to find proxies for each of these. Denoting 
the proxies as zW, z and z, respectively, a simple empirical model can be written as: 
t t t t W z z k z          , , ,      (9) 
The parameter of interest is , the effect of the release of a public signal on welfare. 
Depending on its quality,  can take different signs: for sufficiently precise signals,  should 
be positive, whereas the essential question is whether it is possible to identify signals that do 
lead to a deterioration in welfare, i.e. for which < 0.
However, the Morris-Shin model also implies that the desirability of the disclosure of a public 
signal depends on the market environment. It does so in two dimensions. Even though this is 
not discussed in the Morris-Shin and Svensson debate, it is evident from equation (8) that the 
hurdle rate depends also on the weight r given to the beauty contest by market participants. 
Relaxing the assumption that r is a constant, a given signal is more likely to be too noisy the 
higher is r, such that the probability of finding a negative  should be accordingly larger. We 
will therefore attempt to identify types of communication or time periods where we can 
reasonably assume that r is relatively high. 13
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Furthermore, the model postulates an effect of the quality of the private information of market 
participants. This is formalized in equation (8) and implies that the issuance of a public signal 
with a level of precision  is more likely to be beneficial when the quality of private 
information is low (i.e. for low ). To test this possibility, we transform model (9) to yield: 




        )) 1 ( ( ) ( , 2 , 1 , 0 ,    (10) 
with D
 = 1 if the noisiness of private information is above its mean over the whole sample 
period and D
 = 0 if it is below or equal to its mean. This formulation obviously has the 
drawback of not fully exploiting the continuity of the variable z,t in the interaction, but it has 
the advantage of yielding more easily interpretable coefficients.  
Thus the second hypothesis of primary interest for our analysis is whether the effect of public 
information, as provided through communication, is more beneficial for welfare when the 
precision of private signals is lower, or formally: 
2 1 0 :    H
The hypothesis that public information is beneficial under noisy private information, and 
detrimental otherwise amounts to  
0 ; 0 : 2 1 0 
    H
Models (9) and (10), and the hypotheses derived from them, constitute the core of our 
empirical analysis. However, we first turn to the issue of how to measure welfare, public 
signals and the quality of private signals. 
4.2   Data: measuring welfare and the quality of public and private information 
The empirical analysis is conducted for the Federal Reserve since February 1994, when it 
started announcing interest rate decisions immediately following its Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) meetings. Our sample ends in May 2004. This sub-section outlines the 
definitions of the dependent and independent variables for the empirical analysis. 
4.2.1  Dependent variables: Measuring predictability at short and medium horizons 
To find a proxy zW,t for social welfare W, it is necessary to identify the objective of central 
bank communication. Our main premise is that a successful communication strategy should 
make a central bank well understood by the public, which should in turn imply that the public 
can infer the future actions of the central bank by observing the current or expected 
macroeconomic conditions. Hence the actions pi of agents in the social welfare function (3) 
may be interpreted as the pricing of agents’ expectations about the upcoming decision, e.g. on 
the Fed Funds futures market. Accordingly, the fundamental  in (3) may be interpreted as the 
policy rate after the decision. Equation (3) thus can be understood as communication being 
conducted by central banks with the objective of maximizing the predictability of its future 
policy path. Although we recognize that predictability does not in itself constitute a welfare 
criterion, and at best covers the notion of welfare implied by Morris and Shin only very 
partially, we base our analysis on the presumption that higher predictability on average is 
likely to be welfare-enhancing. 14
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We use two alternative dependent variables which may be influenced by central bank 
communication and transparency: the predictability of the next FOMC decision, and of the 
future path of interest rates. For the first of these variables, measures of predictability at the 
short horizon are easily obtained. We measure the surprise component of interest rate 
decisions as the absolute value of the difference between the actual decision and the mean of 
the survey expectations conducted by Reuters. Reuters conducts these surveys among a fairly 
wide set of market participants and observers a few days before each decision. This survey-
based measure has been shown to be an efficient and unbiased proxy for the surprise 
component of monetary policy decisions (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005).
6 To obtain a 
measure of predictability, we multiply the surprise measure with -1 so that a smaller (more 
negative) value implies less predictability. Our first proxy is therefore 
t




z       , 1 * ,
,
) (
, where rt denotes the policy rate resulting at the FOMC 
meeting on date t, and Ei,t*(rt) the corresponding expectation of an individual respondent 
expressed in the Reuters survey at t*, a few days prior to the meeting.
7
As to the second proxy, it is much more difficult to measure monetary policy predictability at 
longer horizons. Calculating mean forecast errors over a longer horizon of e.g. one or two 
years is not meaningful as it is understood that future decisions are conditional on incoming 
macroeconomic data. As such, a large forecast error at a given point in time can reflect either 
the arrival of new information or that central bank communication was not able to convey 
well the central bank’s views or reaction function to the public. We are not able to disentangle 
these two alternatives, such that we need to find an alternative measure of predictability.  
In the vein of Faust and Svensson (2001), transparency and successful central bank 
communication at longer horizons should imply that market participants can fully understand 
the intentions and goals of a central bank and how it may react to specific shocks in the 
future. Given a specific set of expectations about future macroeconomic variables, such 
transparency about the goals and the reaction function should thus entail that there is a 
homogeneous understanding of the likely future path of monetary policy across financial 
market participants. We therefore use the heterogeneity or dispersion of policy monetary 
policy forecasts across financial market participants as our proxy for the medium-run 
predictability of FOMC policy.
8
This measure is derived from the Reuters surveys mentioned above, which includes 
expectations about monetary policy rates at the end of the current or the subsequent year. We 
construct a measure of uncertainty within each survey, which is the standard deviation of the 
responses across individual forecasters. To obtain a measure of predictability, we multiply 
this uncertainty measure with -1. Our second proxy is therefore    ) ( * , , k t t i t W r E stdev z    ,
where k denotes the forecast horizon in a given Reuters survey. 
It is important to note that the forecast horizon for this type of survey differs over time; on 
average, it amounts to 2 quarters. In our empirical analysis, we will therefore control for the 
length of the forecast horizon in each survey. It is furthermore important to stress that this 
definition of predictability of policy at a medium-term horizon is also conditional on 
                                                
6 Note that the empirical findings are very similar when using market-based measures of expectations, 
based on fed funds futures as in Gürkaynak et al. (2005). The main rationale for using survey data is to 
be consistent between the two measures for the dependent variable. 
7 Note that a possible alternative definition of predictability, namely        N i t t t i t W r r E N z , 1 * , , ) ( / 1 ,
leads to identical results. 
8 Swanson (2006) studies cross-sectional heterogeneity in the forecasts of monetary policy, and finds 
this to be reduced with increasing FOMC transparency over the last decades. 15
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expectations about future macroeconomic conditions and shocks. Controlling for the degree 
of macroeconomic uncertainty prevailing at the time of the survey allows us to understand the 
extent to which central bank communication can affect uncertainty among financial market 
participants about later decisions.
9
The availability of these survey data defines our sample frequency: surveys are conducted 
prior to each FOMC meeting. Accordingly, we have 8 observations each year, bringing us to 
a total of 80 observations for our sample period February 1994 – May 2004 for the short-term 
predictability. Data for medium-term predictions are available to us starting May 1999, 
amounting to 44 observations in total. 
4.2.2 Independent variables: communication – public signals 
As described in Section 3, Morris, Shin and Tong (2006) argue that an empirical test of the 
model should study the effects of the issuance of a public signal, rather than those of an 
incremental increase in the degree of transparency. We therefore have to identify measures 
for the release of public signals by the FOMC, for testing purposes ideally with some 
variation in their precision. One possible application is the extent to which the FOMC is 
willing to guide financial market expectations about upcoming interest rate decisions through 
forward-looking statements beyond that provided in the statements accompanying the 
announcement of a policy decision. Hence, we will treat all inter-meeting communication that 
occurs between the day following an FOMC meeting and prior to the next FOMC meeting as 
one communication event, and try attempt to measure the degree of its precision.  
To do so, we employ the data developed and described in detail in Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2007a). This dataset collects all pieces of communication that contain some reference to 
monetary policy inclinations by the committee as well as by its individual members in the 
intermeeting period, using the newswire service Reuters News to extract all statements at a 
daily frequency. Each individual statement has subsequently been classified as to whether it 
indicates an inclination towards monetary policy tightening, towards an easing, or is neutral. 
Appendix A gives a detailed account of the underlying methodology of the construction of the 
dataset, and Table 1 provides an overview of the communication data in this database. 
Table 1
Based on this dataset, we construct a few measures that provide a characterization of the 
entire inter-meeting communication according to two dimensions.  
 
1. The precision of the FOMC’s inter-meeting communication
Here, we try to identify whether communication in a given inter-meeting period 
shows a high or low , differentiating two aspects. First, in their inter-meeting 
communication, FOMC members might want to give their individual views about 
monetary policy inclinations. Doing so will reveal information to financial markets, 
namely about the diversity of views on the committee. However, we argue that 
dispersed communication is relatively noisy, and should therefore be associated with 
a rather low . Appendix A2 explains how we construct a measure for dispersion of 
communication (“dispersion among committee members”). The basic idea is to create 
a measure that lies between 0 and 1, with zero implying that all committee members’ 
statements in an inter-meeting period show the same policy inclination (i.e. towards 
tightening, easing or neutral). By contrast, a dispersion of 1 means that there is a 
                                                
9 In line with this reasoning, Bauer et al. (2006) find that the immediate release of FOMC decisions 
since 1994 has led to more synchronized private sector forecasts of future economic conditions, while 
they find only little evidence that this change has reduced the magnitude of common forecast errors. 16
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maximum degree of disagreement among committee members.
10 A related measure 
of communication dispersion (“dispersion with committee releases”) is used for the 
consistency of statements of individual FOMC members with that of the entire 
committee, such as the release of the Minutes or the Humphrey-Hawkins testimonies.  
Controlling for the degree of dispersion, more frequent communication should 
provide more information and better understanding among market participants about 
future policy decisions. Accordingly, we conjecture that this characteristic of inter-
meeting communication bears a high degree of precision . The measure “frequency 
of communication” is constructed by simply counting the number of statements by 
FOMC members in a given inter-meeting period.  
2. The relevance of the beauty contest.
These characteristics attempts to identify whether communication takes place under a 
high or low r. Having controlled for the content and the frequency of communication 
as described above, we proxy the market’s attention to FOMC communication by its 
market impact on interest rates in the inter-meeting period (“size of communication 
effects”).
11 Here, our prior is less clear cut. On the one hand, a sizable market reaction 
suggests that r is relatively large. On the other hand, for this to be a true measure of r, 
it is important to control for the content of communication, as otherwise a large 
market reaction could also arise in response to informative communication. However, 
as the two scenarios imply different signs for the effect of communication on 
predictability (communication under high r is more likely to be detrimental for 
predictability, informative communication more likely to bear a high  and thus to 
raise predictability), it is an empirical issue to see which dominates.  
Finally, our last characteristic of communication in the intermeeting period is based 
on the fact that the FOMC, like most central banks in mature economies has a self-
imposed purdah period during which committee members agree not to communicate 
with the public. For the FOMC, the purdah appears to apply 7 days before and 3 days 
after FOMC meetings (Federal Reserve 1995). The underlying reasoning is that 
statements just prior to policy-setting meetings are undesirable as they risk unsettling 
markets and possibly limiting the options of the committee (Bank of England 2000, 
Federal Reserve 1995). The existence of such purdah periods suggests that situations 
where more communication lowers predictability are a real possibility. In the 
framework of the Morris-Shin model, this implies a time-varying weight given the 
public signal; if it is excessively high, central banks prefer not to communicate. We 
use the fact that there are occasional instances of communication during the purdah 
period – either intentionally to communicate important new information, by mistake, 
or because the media may hold back reporting on statements until the purdah period – 
to test whether such communication is indeed detrimental to predictability.
12 We 
therefore include a dummy variable capturing whether or not communication during a 
purdah period took place (“communication in purdah period”), and assume that such 
communication carries a high r.  
                                                
10 We have tested in two ways whether the dispersion measure captures differences in views across 
members or an evolution of views over time. First, dispersion measures for individual FOMC members 
are close to zero; second, a dispersion measure for the two weeks prior to an FOMC meeting rather 
than for the entire inter-meeting period leads to basically unchanged results. Both tests therefore 
suggest that the dispersion measure truly identifies different views of the individual members. 
11 We measure the reaction of three-month treasury bills on the day of each statement (controlling for 
the effects of macroeconomic announcements), and cumulate the absolute reactions over the days of 
the inter-meeting period where a statement is recorded.  
12 For instance, former Chairman Greenspan testified to Congress a few days prior to FOMC meetings 
in January 1994, September 1994, March 1997, and May 2003. 17
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4.2.3  Independent variables: the precision of private signals 
What are “private signals” that market participants receive and which influence their 
decisions? Recall from section 3 the definition of private signals as  i i x     , with   as the 
fundamentals and i as the private signals and their relative precision 
2 / 1     . The quality 
of private signals is difficult to measure, as information that differs across agents, by its very 
nature, is hard to observe. We define three proxies zt – which, however, are naturally defined 
as noisiness rather than precision of private signals. The first two are the heterogeneity across 
market participants in their forecasts for CPI inflation and for GDP growth over the coming 
year. The source of this data is the Blue Chip Economic Indicators data, which conducts 
monthly surveys of about 30 market participants. These forecasts are certainly strongly 
influenced by economic conditions which are common knowledge, but the difference across 
agents should largely reflect private information, either about underlying economic factors or 
about how these affect inflation and growth over the medium term. We use the cross-sectional 
standard deviation of the last survey before an FOMC meeting of the two forecasts as two 
proxies for the noisiness of private signals.
13
As a third proxy for the underlying uncertainty, we use the volatility of short-term (3-month) 
interest rates in the inter-meeting period. A larger degree of interest rate volatility is likely to 
partly reflect a larger heterogeneity in private information. In order to avoid a potential 
endogeneity that communication may cause more interest rate volatility, we measure interest 
rate volatility as the standard deviation of daily interest rate changes during the pre-event 
window, i.e. before communication takes place in each inter-meeting period (see Figure 2).  
Figures 2 and 3 
Figure 3 plots these three proxies for the noisiness of private signals over the FOMC inter-
meeting periods since February 1994. While there is some variability in all three of the series 
from one inter-meeting period to the next, also some longer term patterns are present in the 
data. In particular, forecast dispersion was higher in 1998 and again in 2001-2002. Similarly, 
interest rate volatility was larger in earlier periods and has declined somewhat in recent years. 
Note that the large volatility outlier prior to the FOMC meeting in October 2001 is related to 
the September 11 attacks but does not drive the empirical results presented below. 
4.2.4  Other controls 
As discussed in detail above, it is important to control for relevant economic factors that are 
common knowledge and may influence policy predictability, apart from communication and 
the noisiness of private signals. In particular, information that is fundamentally distinct from 
communication and is likely to be relevant to predict policy decisions is information about 
important macroeconomic variables released in an inter-meeting period. Policy decisions may 
be harder to predict when there is a high degree of underlying economic uncertainty. In such 
an environment, it is more likely that economic news are contradictory and do not provide a 
unanimous message about the path of the economy. We use ten of the most relevant 
macroeconomic news releases for to the United States and construct a macro news dispersion
                                                
13 Cukierman and Wachtel (1979, 1982) show that the cross-sectional variance of survey expectations 
data provides a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. We are grateful to Tao Zha for kindly sharing 
these data series with us. Note that the survey asks its participants to provide expectations through the 
end of the subsequent year. We use standard deviation measures of expectations that are seasonally 
adjusted, using a regression of the series on monthly dummies, in order to control for different time 
lengths of forecast horizons. 18
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measure similar to those for communication dispersion.
14 Moreover, again similar in 
methodology to the proxies for communication, we use the frequency and the cumulated 
impact of macroeconomic news on short-term interest rates in each inter-meeting period as 
two further proxies for the information content inherent in macroeconomic announcements. 
Finally, we also include dummy variables indicating whether the FOMC had changed interest 
rates or issued an asymmetric bias at the previous FOMC meeting, as these may help markets 
better anticipate future decisions. 
5. The effectiveness of communication 
Turning to the empirical results, we start by analyzing the overall effectiveness of 
communication for the short-term and medium-term predictability of FOMC decisions 
(section 5.1), before we present a number of extensions and robustness tests (section 5.2). 
Finally, the section discusses the evidence concerning the dependence of the effectiveness of 
communication on the noisiness of private signals (section 5.3). 
5.1   Effectiveness of communication  
We first analyze the overall effect of the various communication elements on the short-term 
predictability of FOMC decisions and the heterogeneity of medium-horizon forecasts of 
market participants, based on the empirical model of equation (9). We employ a censored 
regression or tobit model in order to take into account that a few of our dependent variables 
are censored to lie at or above zero. The main hypothesis of interest is whether > 0 or 
 0, 
i.e. whether we can identify characteristics of communication or instances that exert different 
effects on predictability. 
Table 2 shows the estimates for the short-term predictability of subsequent FOMC decisions, 
starting from a full model, i.e. including both proxies for public and private signals 
respectively, in the first column, and then showing separately the estimates for only the public 
signals and only the private signals in the second and third columns. The findings indicate 
that a higher frequency of statements by the FOMC and its members helps improve short-
term predictability. This stresses that frequent information of markets through central bank 
communication is indeed beneficial.  
Table 2
By contrast, communication dispersion among FOMC members lowers the predictability of 
policy decisions significantly. Importantly, the effect of communication dispersion is sizable. 
A high degree of communication dispersion in an inter-meeting period, i.e. when this 
dispersion variable is one as opposed to zero, raises the surprise of the FOMC decision by 
about 5 basis points.
15 Given that the average absolute surprise component contained in 
                                                
14 The set of macro news comprises advance GDP, consumer confidence, CPI, industrial production, 
ISM survey, nonfarm payrolls, PPI, retail sales, trade balance and unemployment. We use the surprise 
component within each macroeconomic announcement, by subtracting a survey-based expectation 
measure (obtained from MMS International) from the actually released figure. The macro dispersion 
measure follows that for communication, detailed in Appendix A2., using the direction of the surprise 
of macro announcements to classify them as containing positive or negative news about the economy. 
Higher than expected inflation releases are counted as “positive” surprises, as they would point towards 
higher interest rates in the same fashion as “positive” real developments. 
15 Note that the point estimates shown in the tables for the tobit estimators are marginal effects 
evaluated at the respective means of the vector independent variables, and thus one cannot easily 
evaluate the effect of any change on the dependent variable. However, evaluating the model at each 19
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FOMC decisions, as calculated from our Reuters poll dataset, is around 3.4 basis points, this 
implies that dispersion among committee members about policy inclinations has a substantial 
overall effect on the predictability of monetary policy. As the average degree of 
communication dispersion on policy inclination is 0.252, as indicated in Table 1, this suggests 
that overall this communication dispersion has accounted for about one third of the market’s 
prediction errors of FOMC monetary policy decisions since 1994. This suggests that highly 
dispersed communication is on average not sufficiently precise to pass the hurdle rate, such 
that its provision reduces the predictability of monetary policy decisions.  
Also our measures for the relevance of the beauty contest show that the release of a public 
signal can reduce predictability. The coefficient for the size of communication effects, though 
statistically significant only in (2), suggests that predictability could be lower in situations 
where markets pay a lot of attention to central bank communication. This is corroborated by 
the findings on the effects of communication during the purdah period, which are detrimental 
and reduce the short-term predictability of FOMC decisions. In fact, communicating during 
the purdah period raises the forecast error by 2.6 b.p. in the full model. This confirms what 
policy-makers in virtually all central banks of mature economies have argued, namely that 
making statements just prior to policy meetings introduces uncertainty which lowers the 
market’s ability to anticipate decisions. 
As to the noisiness of private signals, more forecast heterogeneity about GDP growth indeed 
appears to lower the predictability of FOMC decisions, though neither CPI forecast 
heterogeneity nor interest rate volatility are significant in the benchmark specification (1). It 
should be stressed that it is not clear whether a lower precision of private signals should 
necessarily affect the predictability of monetary policy decisions. If this uncertainty is fully 
shared by and reflects that of the members of the policy-setting committee, then a higher 
dispersion in information among private agents may not affect the predictability of policy 
decisions. Recall that the key argument of the model presented above is that the noisiness of 
private signals merely alters the effect that communication has on financial markets. We turn 
to this hypothesis in detail below in section 5.3. 
Moreover, there seems to be little role for macroeconomic news and uncertainty in 
influencing the predictability of FOMC decisions, with the exception of the size of the effect 
of macroeconomic news on financial markets. This implies that when a lot of new and 
unexpected macroeconomic information comes to the market, it may induce market 
participants to become more uncertain about how the FOMC may react to it in the subsequent 
meeting, thus making it more difficult for markets to anticipate decisions. 
As to our second measure, we turn to the effects of private and public signals on the 
predictability of FOMC decisions at a medium term. This is an interesting extension to Table 
2, because communication frequently has a much longer time horizon by conveying views of 
policy-makers and the FOMC about the path of future monetary policy. Table 3 shows that 
the results are to some extent similar to those for the short-term predictability in that a higher 
frequency of statements increases, but communication dispersion lowers predictability of the 
future path of US interest rates. 
Table 3
                                                                                                                               
dispersion measure of zero and then comparing it to the predicted value with the respective dispersion 
measure at one, shows that the overall effect of such a change is very similar, in most cases only 
slightly larger than the marginal effects shown in the tables. For instance, for Table 2 a change of US 
communication dispersion on policy inclinations from zero to one raises the prediction error by 5.4 
basis points as compared to a marginal effect of 5.1 (or 0.051) in the table.  20
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However, there are also some interesting and intuitive differences between the impact of 
communication on the short- and the medium-term predictability of US monetary policy. 
Communication in the purdah period negatively affects predictability only at the short horizon 
for the next meeting, but has no effect on the uncertainty surrounding the future policy path. 
This result seems intuitive and sensible given the specific characteristics of this type of 
communication. Finally, interest rate changes at the previous FOMC meeting appear to 
influence only the predictability of decisions at the next meeting, but not beyond. 
In summary, we find that communication exerts a statistically and economically significant 
effect on the predictability of US monetary policy, both at the short and the medium-term. 
More frequent and regular communication appears to be beneficial in helping markets settle 
and better anticipate future decisions. By contrast, communication dispersion and the timing 
of statements close to meetings during the purdah period seem to be detrimental. Moreover, 
the section has outlined a few differences in the effect of central bank communication on 
predictability at different horizons. This first test therefore suggests that the effects of 
communication depend critically on the precision of the public signal, and on the weight 
given to these signals by market participants. Less precise signals, or signals that are 
disclosed in the presence of a large r are more likely to reduce predictability. 
5.2 Extensions and robustness 
We now turn to several sensitivity tests to check for the robustness of our results. Two crucial 
issues are the possibility of an omitted variable bias affecting our results and the potential 
endogeneity of communication. The reasoning goes as follows: the fact that we find a 
significant effect of communication on predictability in Tables 2-3 may simply reflect the 
possibility that some elements of communication are influenced and determined by other 
factors that are not included in the model. In particular the communication dispersion and 
statements in the purdah period may partly reflect changes in the economic environment or 
new and conflicting information. For instance, high communication dispersion may merely 
reflect the large degree of macroeconomic uncertainty caused by conflicting or unclear 
signals coming from macroeconomic or other news, which in turn lead to lower predictability 
of policy decisions, implying an omitted variable bias. Alternatively, policy decisions may be 
more difficult to predict when interest rates are changed, which in turn may raise the degree 
of disagreement and thus communication dispersion in the inter-meeting period, inducing an 
endogeneity bias. Similarly, the fact that FOMC members communicate in the purdah period 
could be explained by new information that they wish to share with the market, but which 
need to be controlled for when analyzing the impact of such communication on markets. 
We deal with these issues in two separate ways. First, we include as broad a set of control 
variables as possible in our model. Hence our preferred specification is the one shown in 
columns (1) in Tables 2-3 as here we can control for several other factors. However, as a 
comparison of the various specifications ranging from a more minimalist specification (2) to a 
more extensive one in (1) shows, the results with regard to communication are mostly robust, 
both in terms of significance and in terms of the size of the coefficients. We also tested for 
other definitions of the various variables, including alternative measures of dispersion. The 
results are robust to these tests, but for brevity reasons not shown here. 
Further variables that were added to the regression and tested, but did not alter results, are i) 
dummy variables indicating whether the balance of views expressed by the committee is in 
line with the balance of views expressed by the head of the committee, ii) a variable that 
captures different degrees of policy activism by summing the number of times interest rates 
had been changed at the last 10 meetings prior to the current meeting, and iii) a variable 
capturing the voting dispersion in the preceding meeting. 21
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As a second approach, we instrument communication dispersion and statements in the purdah 
period through various factors that may influence these but at the same time are truly 
exogenous to communication as well as to monetary policy decisions. For instance, macro 
news dispersion can be considered as strictly exogenous because releases of macroeconomic 
data – which are for economic developments of previous months – are usually influenced 
neither by communication nor by the current or the last monetary policy decisions. The aim is 
to use such instruments for determining communication and then to employ the instrumented 
communication variables in model (9) to see whether the findings are sensitive to those 
shown in Tables 2-3. We therefore estimate a tobit model for communication dispersion, and 
similarly a simple probit model for the dummy variable of whether or not there was 
communication during the purdah period. 
Table 4 shows the results for communication dispersion on policy inclinations, using both the 
tobit estimator and an OLS estimator. A first variable that comes out as driver for dispersion 
is the frequency of communication, i.e. a larger participation and number of statements is 
associated with higher dispersion. This is an interesting result because it indicates that while a 
higher frequency of communication improves the predictability of decisions (see Table 2), it 
also raises communication dispersion, while communication dispersion itself worsens 
predictability. Moreover, more market uncertainty, proxied by the pre-event interest volatility, 
also raises communication dispersion. This suggests that to some extent dispersed views 
among committee members reflect a more uncertain economic environment. We conduct a 
similar analysis for explaining communication in the purdah period, which is not shown here 
for brevity reasons. 
Table 4
As a final step, we re-estimate the empirical model but use the instrumented communication 
variables in the model instead of their actual values. Table 5 shows that our previous findings 
are robust and confirmed by this approach using instrumented variables.
16 First, 
communication dispersion among committee members is again highly statistically significant, 
showing that more dispersion leads to lower predictability. Moreover, also statements in the 
purdah period lower predictability. By contrast, a higher frequency of communication 
enhances the predictability of decisions. 
Table 5
For a final robustness test, we want to understand whether the results depend on the 
judgmental, and thus subjective, classification of the content of communication, as described 
in Appendix A1. As an alternative classification of communication, we categorized 
statements based on the reaction of short-term interest rates on the day of the statements. For 
instance, a statement is classified as a tightening statement if interest rates rise on the same 
day. Such a classification procedure may be imprecise as several other pieces of relevant 
news may occur on the day when a statement is made, and because it allows only for very few 
neutral statements. However, it is interesting to note that such an agnostic procedure delivers 
results that confirm the importance of communication for the predictability of monetary 
policy decisions. The results are not shown here for brevity reasons but broadly confirm the 
results outlined above.
                                                
16 Note that we estimate both steps separately, i.e. we first obtain the instrumented variables, and then 
in the second step use these instrumented variables in the tobit specification. Thus we do not estimate 
an explicit tobit-IV due to the demanding assumption this requires to obtain efficient estimators (see 
Honore and Hu 2003). 22
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5.3 State-dependence of communication effects  
The second key hypothesis in the vein of the Morris-Shin and Svensson debate is that the 
effectiveness of central bank communication may depend on the specific environment in 
which it occurs. Specifically, disclosure of a public signal is more likely to be beneficial if it 
takes place when private signals are relatively noisy. The model to be tested is that of 
equation (10), and our hypothesis of interest is 	, or in a more stringent form 
and	<0.
As discussed in section 4, we proxy the noise of private signals through the three variables of 
forecast heterogeneity about CPI inflation and GDP growth as well as the pre-event interest 
rate volatility in each inter-meeting period. Table 6 shows the results for the effect of 
communication on the short-term predictability of FOMC decisions. In the table, each 
element of communication has two coefficients, the upper one (“high noise of private 
signals”) corresponding to  and the lower one (“low noise of private signals”) to 2. Table 7 
provides the same set of results for the heterogeneity of medium-horizon forecasts of the 
future path of monetary policy. The columns labeled “sig.” provide p-values for a t-test of the 
hypothesis Ho:  1=2.
Tables 6-7 
Table 6 shows evidence that the effect of communication on policy predictability indeed 
depends on the noise of the private information present. In all 15 cases but two it holds that 1
> 2, i.e. communication is more beneficial (or less detrimental in case 1 and 2 are smaller 
than zero) to short-term predictability when private information is relatively noisy. However, 
given the limited number of observations of 80, this difference is significant statistically 
mostly only when proxying private signals through GDP forecast heterogeneity and interest 
rate volatility, as indicated by the columns labeled “sig.” showing the p-values for the test of 
equality of the two coefficients. A higher frequency of communication always improves 
predictability, but more so when market uncertainty is high. By contrast, communication 
dispersion across FOMC members and statements in the purdah period are always detrimental 
for predictability, but in particular when the noisiness of private signals is low. 
Table 7 provides evidence that this state-dependence of the effects of communication also 
applies to the predictability of the policy path, though the asymmetries are statistically 
significant only for CPI forecast heterogeneity as well as interest rate volatility as proxies for 
the noisiness of private signals. Again, for most cases (12 out of 15) communication is more 
beneficial when there is a high noise of private signals. When taking interest rate volatility as 
a proxy for market uncertainty, this different effect of communication is statistically 
significant for all five elements of communication analyzed. 
Overall, the empirical findings therefore suggest that the effectiveness of communication is 
indeed dependent on the market environment in which it takes place. An interesting 
difference arises when comparing the results of short-term and medium-term predictability, 
namely the sharp difference in the effect of communication dispersion, in particular the 
dispersion across FOMC members. Communication dispersion always worsens  short-term
predictability, but it is actually beneficial at the medium term when interest rate volatility is 
high. Although it should be stressed that this finding is not robust across the different proxies 
of market uncertainty, it again underlines the difference in the effect of communication on 
short-term predictability versus the longer-term policy path. It is also suggestive that e.g. 
communicating the dispersed views across FOMC members hurts short-term predictability 
but may actually be beneficial in improving market participants’ understanding of future 
FOMC policy. 23
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6. Conclusions
How central banks should communicate remains controversial and intensely debated both in 
the academic literature as well as among policy-makers. While an increase in transparency 
over the past decade has helped improve the effectiveness of monetary policy, it is unclear 
what precisely constitutes an optimal communication strategy. The seminal work by Morris 
and Shin (2002), Amato, Morris and Shin (2002), the comment by Svensson (2006) and the 
reply by Morris, Shin and Tong (2006) illustrates that there is an important controversy about 
whether central bank communication is necessarily enhancing welfare and under what 
conditions it may actually be detrimental. There are two central hypotheses in this debate. The 
first is that communication per se may not always be beneficial as a central bank statement 
may be noisy and thus lead to sub-optimal market reactions. The second is that the 
effectiveness of communication may depend on the market environment in which it occurs, 
i.e. it is more likely to be beneficial under conditions of high market uncertainty and noisiness 
of private signals. 
The objective of this paper has been to test these two hypotheses empirically for the Federal 
Reserve since 1994. The paper has employed two benchmarks for this purpose: the effect of 
communication on the short-term predictability of subsequent FOMC decisions and on the 
extent of uncertainty about the medium-term path of monetary policy. A limitation of this 
approach is clearly that it covers the notion of welfare implied by Morris and Shin only very 
partially, and does not capture all goals of central bank communication, as also the 
improvement of the market’s understanding of the policy strategy and the reaction of a central 
bank to shocks are important objectives of communication (Woodford 2005), which is, 
however, beyond the scope of the paper.  
Concerning the first of the hypotheses, the empirical results of the paper indicate that 
communication exerts a statistically and economically significant effect on the short-term 
predictability as well as the uncertainty about the future policy path. The effect of 
communication does depend on the precision of the signal that is issued, however. More 
precise signals, namely more frequent communications, are beneficial in helping markets 
better anticipate future decisions. By contrast, communication that is dispersed and conveys 
not a single committee view but a variety of views on monetary policy inclinations reduces 
the predictability of decisions and worsens the ability of market participants to understand the 
future path of monetary policy. Moreover, the effect of communication depends also on the 
weight that financial markets attach to it; if this weight is exceptionally large, communication 
can easily be detrimental for predictability. In particular, statements that occur during the 
purdah period before FOMC meetings appear, on average, to have such a detrimental effect.  
As to the second hypothesis, the empirical findings suggest that the effectiveness of 
communication is highly state-dependent. In general, communication is more effective in an 
environment of large market uncertainty and more likely to be detrimental if the noisiness of 
private signals is low. Moreover, there are remarkable differences when comparing the results 
with regard to short-term predictability and the uncertainty about the policy path. One of these 
differences is that communication amid high market uncertainty often lowers the 
heterogeneity about the future FOMC policy path, but rarely improves short-term 
predictability. This is suggestive that statements that may enhance the understanding of the 
policy path over the medium term may not necessarily improve the short-term predictability 
of subsequent decisions, highlighting a further important trade-off for communication policy. 
There are several caveats and limitations to the approach of the paper, partly related to the 
difficulty of measuring transparency and communication, and identifying their effect on 
policy objectives. Nevertheless, understanding how communication can guide and shape 
expectations is crucial for central banks to achieve their ultimate policy objectives. An 24
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important insight stemming from the current debate on transparency and from the empirical 
findings of the paper is that the effectiveness of communication depends on the market 
environment in which it operates. In fact, a number of central banks are currently in the 
process of reviewing their communication strategies, with some implicitly acknowledging the 
limits to transparency and thus restricting the amount and type of information they are willing 
to share. The findings of the paper may contribute to this debate by underlining the limits to 
transparency and stressing the importance of flexibility in communication policies to adjust to 
market needs and conditions in order to achieve their ultimate objectives. 25
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Appendix A: 
Measuring communication and its dispersion 
This appendix explains in detail the measurement of communication by the FOMC and its 
members and the identification of communication dispersion or disagreement among the 
committee members. 
A.1  Communication 
For the measurement of communication, our analysis is based on the data developed and 
described in more detail in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a). The objective is to obtain all 
pieces of communication that contain statements about the monetary policy inclination, by the 
FOMC as well as by its individual members. We use the Federal Reserve website to identify 
statements by the FOMC, and the newswire service Reuters News to extract all statements by 
FOMC members, focusing on forward-looking statements and avoiding duplication of 
statements in the database. The extraction is done in a mechanical manner using a set of 
search words, consisting of the name of the policy maker together with the words “interest 
rates”, “monetary policy” or “inflation”. This classification follows the examples by the work 
of Guthrie and Wright (2000) and Kohn and Sack (2004). 
As a final step, we classify the statements into those that indicate an inclination towards 
monetary policy tightening, those that suggest an easing, and those that are neutral: 

















The upper panel of Table 1 provides an overview of the communication data in our database. 
The classification of the statements is important and thus needs a more detailed discussion. 
The technique of extracting meaning from language is often referred to as content analysis 
(e.g. Holsti 1969). The idea of content analysis is to devise a number of rules to provide a 
clean classification and to minimize the number of false classifications. In our case, the 
statements have been double-checked by the authors and independently by a research analyst. 
In case there was a disagreement on the classification, other reports were used to classify the 
statement. A statement was discarded if no agreement could be reached. Overall, most 
statements were judged to be unanimous and only a relatively small number of statements 
was excluded from the analysis.
17
Nevertheless, a number of additional caveats should be stressed at this point. First, the list of 
statements included in our database may not capture all statements by all committee members 
as Reuters News may be selective in its reporting. Second, statements by policy-makers may 
                                                
17 As an alternative classification of communication, we use the reaction of three-month interest rates 
on the day of the statement, or more precisely the difference of the closing quote with that of the 
previous day, as a proxy for the content of each statement. For instance, a statement on monetary 
policy inclinations on a day when interest rates rise is classified as a tightening statement. This same 
classification is used for the releases of statements by the committee as a whole (Minutes by the FOMC 
or testimonies of the Chairman). Clearly, such a classification procedure may be imprecise as several 
other pieces of relevant news may occur on the day when a statement is made. However, we use this 
classification mainly as a robustness check in our analysis. In fact, given the importance of central bank 
communication for interest rates it turns out that both classification procedures provide very similar 
classifications of the statements and the empirical results below are robust to using either one. The 
results reported in this paper refer to the first classification scheme. 29
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be misreported or be misinterpreted by the markets, and may thus trigger a reaction that is 
undesired by the policy maker and his or her central bank committee. Although we recognize 
the potential relevance of these caveats, for the purpose of this study we are primarily 
interested in the information that market participants receive, and thus we are less concerned 
for instance by the fact that newswire services may decide not to report all statements. 
A.2  Communication dispersion 
An important element of communication for our analysis is the degree of its dispersion. Our 
proxy is based on a dispersion measure used in Jansen and de Haan (2006) and Ehrmann and 























       (A.1) 
with N as the number of statements in the inter-meeting period t, C
MP the statements on 
monetary policy inclinations classified as {-1,0,+1}, as outlined above, and a dummy D with 
D=0 if N is an even number and D=1 if it is odd. This normalization allows us to obtain a 
dispersion measure that lies strictly between zero and one, with 
t = 0 if no dispersion is 
present and all committee members provide statements with the same inclination about 
monetary policy. 
t = 1 if there is a maximum of degree of dispersion across statements 
within an inter-meeting period t. 
An analogous definition of dispersion is used for statements between committee members and 
that of the committee as a whole in the inter-meeting period. This measure proxies the 
dispersion of each member’s statements i with that of the committee as a whole j, based on 






















      (A.2) 
D=0 if (N+M) is an even number and D=1 if it is odd. 30
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Figure 1: Social welfare contours 
Note: The figure illustrates the interaction between the precision of public signals (communication), ,
and the precision of the private signals, , and the resulting welfare. The dashed line shows the 
combinations of  and at which a marginal increase in  has no effect on welfare. To the left of the 
dashed line, a marginal increase in  reduces welfare, to the right it raises it. See Section 2 for the 
derivation of the slope of the dashed line. The dotted lines locate the hurdle rate  for the precision of 
a public signal, such that its issuance does not lower welfare. 





Figure 2: Sequence of events
Pre-event window     Post-event window Communication event window
FOMC meeting t=0 
Communication days
Purdah period 
FOMC meeting t=1 31
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Figure 3: Precision of private signals – forecast heterogeneity and interest 
rate volatility 
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Date
Note: Figure 3.A shows the seasonally-adjusted standard deviation of CPI forecasts and GDP forecasts 
across survey participants in the Blue Chip Economic Indicators data. Figure 3.B shows the 
unconditional volatility in the pre-event window (see Figure 2) of US 3-month treasury bill rates for 
each inter-meeting period.  32
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Table 1: Summary statistics for communication, private signals and 
macroeconomic environment
mean std. dev. min. max.
Number of statements by committee members
     Total 172
     Tightening 56
     Neutral 56
     Easing 60
A.   PUBLIC SIGNALS - CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION
Precision:
     Frequency of communication 2.200 1.919 0 9
     Dispersion among committee members 0.252 0.342 0 1
     Dispersion with committee releases 0.175 0.708 0 1
Relevance of beauty contest:
     Size of communication effects 0.072 0.100 0 0.480
     Communication in purdah period 0.181 0.351 0 1
B.   PRIVATE SIGNALS
     CPI forecast dispersion 0.214 0.094 0.059 0.450
     GDP forecast dispersion 0.256 0.146 0.062 0.711
     Pre-event interest rate volatility 0.797 0.990 0 7.90
C.   CONTROLS
Macroeconomic news:
     Macro news dispersion 0.920 0.102 0.556 1
     Frequency of macro news 9.125 2.399 2 15
     Size of macro news effects 0.097 0.098 0 0.470
Prior FOMC decisions:
     Interest rate change last meeting 0.325 0.471 0 1
     Asymmetric bias last meeting 0.375 0.487 0 1
Note: The table reports summary statistics of the variables analyzed in this paper. Frequency of 
communication: number of statements by FOMC members in each inter-meeting period. Size of 
communication effects: cumulated change in 3-month treasury bill rates no days where a statement by 
FOMC members is recorded, expressed in % p.a.. Dispersion among committee members and with 
committee releases: see Appendix A. Communication in purdah period: dummy variable, set to one if 
communication during a purdah period took place. 33
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Table 2: Communication, private signals and the short-term predictability 
of FOMC decisions 
Tobit estimator
coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
A.   PUBLIC SIGNALS - CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION
Precision:
     Frequency of communication (high ) 0.009 * 0.005 0.009 ** 0.004
     Dispersion among committee members  (low ) -0.057 *** 0.018 -0.054 *** 0.019
     Dispersion with committee releases (low ) 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.007
Relevance of beauty contest:
     Size of communication effects (high r) -0.086 0.060 -0.119 ** 0.052
     Communication in purdah period (high r) -0.034 ** 0.015 -0.030 * 0.015
B.   PRIVATE SIGNALS
     CPI forecast dispersion 0.014 0.103 0.130 0.116
     GDP forecast dispersion -0.125 ** 0.065 -0.149 ** 0.076
     Pre-event interest rate volatility 0.002 0.006 -0.010 * 0.005
C.   CONTROLS
Macroeconomic news:
     Macro news dispersion -0.047 0.050 -0.061 0.061
     Frequency of macro news 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
     Size of macro news effects -0.112 ** 0.048 -0.108 ** 0.054
Prior FOMC decisions:
     Interest rate change last meeting 0.025 ** 0.010 0.014 0.012










Note: Using a tobit estimator for equation (9), the table shows the marginal effects of a change in the 
independent variables z,t and z,t with regard to the predictability of the upcoming interest rate 
decision, zw,t. All variables are defined as explained in the text. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 34
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 Table 3: Communication, private signals and the heterogeneity in 
medium-horizon forecasts of FOMC decisions 
Tobit estimator
coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
A.   PUBLIC SIGNALS - CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION
Precision:
     Frequency of communication (high ) 0.029 *** 0.008 0.029 *** 0.007
     Dispersion among committee members  (low ) -0.091 * 0.051 -0.120 ** 0.052
     Dispersion with committee releases (low ) 0.063 ** 0.030 0.035 0.025
Relevance of beauty contest:
     Size of communication effects (high r) -0.151 0.168 0.043 0.129
     Communication in purdah period (high r) -0.031 0.036 -0.015 0.032
B.   PRIVATE SIGNALS
     CPI forecast dispersion -0.587 * 0.340 -0.113 0.298
     GDP forecast dispersion -0.538 ** 0.215 -0.406 * 0.219
     Pre-event interest rate volatility -0.020 0.017 -0.023 * 0.013
C.   CONTROLS
Macroeconomic news:
     Macro news dispersion 0.105 0.111 0.108 0.114
     Frequency of macro news -0.022 *** 0.006 -0.006 0.006
     Size of macro news effects -0.055 0.140 -0.152 0.147
Prior FOMC decisions:
     Interest rate change last meeting 0.014 0.032 0.011 0.033
     Asymmetric bias last meeting 0.013 0.033 0.020 0.034
# of observations
Likelihood ratio Chi^2 79.22 53.10 45.14
(1) (2) (3)
44 44 44
Note: Using a tobit estimator for equation (9), the table shows the marginal effects of a change in the 
independent variables z,t and z,t with regard to predictability of monetary policy decisions at a 
medium-term horizon. All variables are defined as explained in the text. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively.35
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Table 4: Explaining dispersion in communication about monetary policy 
inclinations
Estimator:
coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
Macro news dispersion 0.076 0.173 0.217 0.297
Pre-event interest rate volatility 0.031 ** 0.016 0.074 ** 0.031
Frequency of communication 0.057 *** 0.010 0.103 *** 0.016
Monetary policy surprise last meeting -0.023 0.208 -0.138 0.366








Note: Using tobit and OLS estimators, the table shows the marginal effects of a change in the 
independent variables ht with regard to the observable variable zt, which is the communication 
dispersion on monetary policy inclinations among committee members. The independent variables ht
are defined as explained in the text. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 
 Table 5: Robustness – IV estimation 
IV for dispersion & purdah communication coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
A.   PUBLIC SIGNALS - CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION
Precision:
     Frequency of communication (high ) 0.024 ** 0.011 0.033 *** 0.008
     Dispersion among committee members  (low ) -0.199 * 0.100 -0.281 *** 0.068
     Dispersion with committee releases (low ) 0.020 0.022 -0.020 0.016
Relevance of beauty contest:
     Size of communication effects (high r) -0.095 0.056 0.054 0.050
     Communication in purdah period (high r) -0.074 ** 0.043 -0.024 * 0.015
# of observations 80 44
Short-term Medium-term
predictability predictability
Note: Instrumenting communication dispersion and timing and using a tobit estimator for equation (9), 
the table shows the marginal effects of a change in the independent variables z,t and z,t with regard to 
predictability of monetary policy decisions at a short and medium-term horizon in the left and right 
panels respectively.  
***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 36
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Table 6: Short-term predictability
 of monetary policy decisions
 – 
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